






AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF THE UNHCR’S PROMOTION OF REPATRIATION 






Department of Public Policy 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 














brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Carolina Digital Repository
2 
Abstract 
 This honors thesis analyzes the promotion of repatriation by the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as the preferred durable solution for refugees since the 
late 1990s and determines if this stance remains appropriate amidst the realities of the state of 
refugees today.  The number of refugees in the world is rising, and fewer individuals are 
returning to their countries of origins; therefore, today, the ability for repatriation to serve it’s 
designated role is shrinking.  The policy currently lacks a clear objective amongst scholars and 
practitioners alike, leading to a lack of consistency in programs and a failure to take into 
consideration problems that have been witnessed in the past.  Primary data in this study is 
gathered from Key Informants from the UNHCR and academia, who are interviewed on various 
topics in order to gain insight into the UNHCR’s preference toward this durable solution.  
Results show that repatriation is preferred because the organization must balance numerous 
conflicting interests, resulting in the choice of a policy that is not best, but seems to be the only 
option.  There are significant consequences that occur after return that the UNHCR is not 
actively trying to avoid in program design.  Evaluation is inconsistently completed, and there is 
rarely an objective for its use.  The lessons learned from repatriation programs at the UNHCR 
are not being used to improve programs in the future, but a change in the system that exists right 
now could lead to positive reforms of policy that prioritize the well-being and desires of the 




 This thesis is a culmination of my undergraduate career at UNC, where I leave with a 
vast gratitude to those who I learned from over the last 4 years.  First, I would like to thank Dr. 
Handa, for his willingness to take on this project with me.  Dr. Handa brought joy to the research 
process, asking me important questions that I may have overlooked, and, importantly, reminding 
me that the risk in asking big questions is worth creating new knowledge.  Thank you to Ben 
Meier for being my second reader, and for teaching me that there is no injustice we should not 
stand up against.  I am grateful for the Informants who were willing to risk their time to speak 
with me.  These individuals are responsible for bringing expertise together to catalyze change to 
the refugee system.  Third, I would like to thank Dr. Gitterman for his guidance of the honors 
students throughout the last 2 semesters.  Thank you for fostering a spirit of camaraderie 
amongst your students and reminding us that our projects were important and possible.  Thank 
you to Dr. Niklaus Steiner, for his assistance in developing a research question.  To all of my 
Public Policy professors who I have grown to love, thank you.  It is because of these individuals 
that my knowledge of the injustice, oppression, and, particularly, the plight of refugees, has 
grown.  They have taught me with a genuine belief that I am capable of making the world better 
by advocating for underserved, oppressed, and forgotten people.  Finally, I could not have 
completed this project without my friends and family, at school and around the United States.  It 
is the notes, kind words, questions, and encouragement that reminded me why this project 
mattered and that this was only a stepping stone towards policies that work for the good of 
millions of exiled people around the world who continue to demonstrate steadfastness, mercy, 
and the perseverance of the human spirit. 
  
4 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 5 
Introduction 5 
The Key Question 6 
Background 7 
Significance to Public Policy 7 
The Following Chapters 9 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 9 
Promoting Voluntary Repatriation 10 
The Decade of Repatriation 12 
Politicization of Return 12 
Blurry Objectives and Disappointing Outcomes 15 
A Struggling International Refugee Regime 19 
Promoting the Well-Being of the Refugee 20 
Considering the Long-Run 21 
Internalizing Positive Externalities 24 
Historical Context 25 
Rwanda 25 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 28 
Chapter 3: Research Design 30 
Methods and Data 31 
Chapter 4: Results 33 
Chapter 5: Recommendations and Conclusions 44 
Limitations and Generalizability 47 
Recommendations 48 
Suggestions for Future Research 49 
Conclusion 50 
References 50 





In the world today, there are approximately 71 million people who have been displaced 
from their homes (UNHCR, 2019).  Approximately 20 million of these people fall under the 
purview of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as refugees, who are 
attempting to survive in exile (UNHCR, 2019).  According to the United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees1, a refugee is: 
...Someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of  
persecution, war or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular 
social group.  (USA for UNHCR, n.d.) 
Refugees are an extremely vulnerable population of individuals who may be granted protection 
and assistance from the international community due to a lack of protection being provided from 
their country of origin.  When individuals flee, they typically opt to remain where relative safety 
exists in neighboring countries.  Due to the concentration of conflict areas in certain regions, the 
biggest burden of refugees has fallen on developing countries.  These host states lack the 
resources to allow refugee populations to remain indefinitely; which is the role that the UNHCR 
has sought to fulfill (Phillips, 2011).  
Created in 1950, the UNHCR has sought for the protection of refugees and the alleviation 
of the refugee problem under their mandate (Betts et al., 2012).  However, as refugee populations 
continue to grow and the average number of years in exile are rising, the framework developed 
to handle refugee displacement under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is 
 
1 Also referred to in this thesis as the Refugee Convention 
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under increasing pressure.  Specifically, the vision of the UNHCR for solving the refugee 
problem has not been adaptable to changing circumstances, new knowledge, and critique.  The 
durable solutions framework used by the UNHCR has relied on three options for refugees: 
repatriation, local integration, and resettlement.  Repatriation has been considered the most 
desirable outcome since the 1980s (Betts et al., 2012).  Repatriation is defined as the return of 
refugees from the host state back to their country of origin and the resumption of protection by 
the country of origin (Jallow & Malik, 2004).  Local integration is the permanent settlement of 
refugees into the host state.  Lastly, and the most uncommon solution, is resettlement which is 
the permanent settlement of refugees in a third country.   This thesis focuses on repatriation and 
the promotion of such policy by the UNHCR. 
The Key Question 
 This study looked at why repatriation has been the preferred policy object of the UNHCR 
and sought to investigate whether this is still the appropriate approach today.  Looking over the 
last 3 decades in particular, the results of this thesis contributed to an understanding about the 
driving reason behind this policy preference, the UNHCR’s goals, the ideal outcomes for 
repatriation, the problem’s that have been witnessed, and how programs have been evaluated and 
designed historically.  In order to move towards more evidence-informed policies in the refugee 
system, this study sought to uncover a deeper understanding of why this policy continues to be 
promoted, considering what has been seen in the past and the factors that are currently changing 




 The current framework that exists to handle refugees is the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees.  This gave legal status to people under the definition of refugee and 
afforded them protection from the UNHCR.   
After the Cold War, a primarily political decision was made by the UNHCR to shift from 
the promotion of resettlement to repatriation (Chimni, 2004).  This decision was not made due to 
any new knowledge on the subject, but solely because of organizational will.  Since then, the 
UNHCR has followed the Handbook for Repatriation and Reintegration Activities to guide the 
repatriation of refugees back to their countries of origin (Jallow & Malik, 2004).  The 
responsibility behind repatriation falls in part on UNHCR for facilitation of return in “safety and 
dignity” and, on the other hand, on the countries of origin for reassuming protection over the 
returnees.  However, oftentimes, the international community has fallen short of ensuring these 
responsibilities are fulfilled.  Amongst Sri Lankan, Bosnian, and Serbian refugees, individuals 
often felt that they had little choice in determining when to return due to the pressure from 
opinions in the international community (Brown & Mansfield, 2009).  In Afghanistan, the 
unprepared state was forced to take back returnees at the urging of the UNHCR, which 
exacerbated the existing instability throughout the country and the broader region (Schmeidl, 
2009).  These are just three examples of what has consistently been seen over the past 3 decades: 
repatriation can, and often does, jeopardize the well-being of refugees and states. 
Significance to Public Policy 
 Currently, there is no common consensus in the literature about what the long-term goal 
of repatriation is, even though it is the predominant solution being promoted.  By building on the 
knowledge that has been discovered since the turn of the century, this study sought to build 
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understanding as to why the UNHCR has chosen to promote repatriation.  This study was 
conducted in hope of beginning the process of learning from repatriation programs, whilst 
establishing a foundation for asking questions about whether or not this is the best policy amidst 
the refugee system that exists today.  Over time, objectives of UNHCR policy could become 
clearer, recognizing that in order to provide solutions that are durable, a lense far broader than 
solely repatriation may be required. 
 This topic covered issues that urgently need solutions and questions that are yet to be 
answered.  The current framework to address refugees is under more strain today than it ever has 
been in history.  Well over half of the world’s refugees have been living in exile for over five 
years and for many, nearly 20 years, often in squalid conditions (Milner & Loescher, 2011).  If 
policy remains stagnant, the system that exists will not endure the new and complex problems 
that the world is witnessing today.  This research not only made a unique contribution to the 
literature, but also called policymakers to action by shedding light on potentially questionable 
policies and procedures relied upon in the past.  The impacts of the organization’s promotion of 
repatriation are being seen today.  Not only is the durable solutions framework failing, 
repatriation itself is proving less and less capable of handling the magnitude of the problem that 
exists.  Some of the negative consequences of repatriation are visible decades after return has 
occurred.  As long as the UNHCR continues to move forward with policies that do not reflect the 
full body of information that is known about repatriation, policies may remain unchanged, failing 
to adapt to the changing system, and potentially resulting in long-term damage to unstable 
regions around the world. 
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The Following Chapters 
In the following chapters, the author will lay out a review of the existing literature, 
providing the reader with a deeper understanding of the system that currently exists to handle 
refugees.  This will expand upon knowledge regarding the role of the UNHCR in the refugee 
system, failures of repatriation, the insufficiency of the durable solutions framework thus far, and 
the need for sustainable repatriation.  In order to inform the reader on specific cases of 
repatriation, historical context will be provided using the repatriations that occurred in Rwanda 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the consequences that followed.   
 Chapter 3 will expand on the research design and methods that will be used in this study.  
This chapter will offer information as to why Rwanda and Yugoslavia provide particularly 
important historical context.  This will detail the primary data collection in the form of Key 
Informant Interviews and the analysis that will follow. 
 Chapter 4 will document the findings of this study from analysis of Key Informant 
Interviews. 
 In Chapter 5, the author will present recommendations and conclusions.  This chapter 
will offer suggestions for a way forward that moves the UNHCR towards a more informed 
policy of repatriation, and will discuss the limitations and generalizability of this research. 
 Following Chapter 5, the final sections will include references and the interview guide in 
the appendix. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, an individual is placed under the UNHCR’s 
mandate when refugee status is acquired, where the organization aims to alleviate immediate 
needs and then move towards durable solutions for the migrant (Cwik, 2011).  This study focuses 
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on the responsibility of the UNHCR to carry out the latter portion of the mandate.  The Durable 
Solutions framework, under which the organization seeks to solve mass refugee movements, 
consists of three possible solutions: voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement.  
Historically, these have been viewed as mutually exclusive alternatives, with UNHCR 
preferences for any single option varying since the inception of the framework (Milner & 
Loescher, 2011).   
 For approximately four decades, the preferred solution in practice was resettlement, as 
fears of repercussions for returnees were realized after a number of returnees who had initially 
fled from persecution under the Stalinist regime were killed or faced harsh consequences upon 
return (Crisp & Long, 2016).  The international community became extremely hesitant to 
encourage return, unsure if protection could be maintained.  During the Cold War, resettlement 
was used as a political tactic, reminding the Soviet Union that those who left were primarily 
turning their backs on the nation permanently.  After the end of the War, the international 
refugee regime shifted its practices and standards to reflect the new reality that refugee flows 
could not be exploited in the same ways to promote the interests of the global North (Bradley, 
2014). 
Promoting Voluntary Repatriation 
 As the world began to move on from the Cold War, the objectives and practices of the 
international refugee regime needed to change to reflect the new circumstances (Bradley, 2014).  
In the mid-1980s, the UNHCR officially began to shift towards voluntary repatriation as the 
preferred durable solution (Chimni, 2004).  This was not necessarily due to any new literature on 
the concept, but based on the changing political environment.  The organization began to 
recognize that the feasibility of resettlement was declining and would no longer be a plausible 
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option for handling refugee movements.  When repatriation efforts started rising, expertise was 
inadequate, resulting in ill-informed expectations and preparation for the consequences of return.  
Over the course of time, questions around the level of voluntariness would grow and, due to a 
heavy burden on select countries, it became difficult to determine refugees’ own desires to 
return. 
 As growing numbers of refugees chose to repatriate at the beginning of the 1990s, the 
UNHCR began to increase the provision of aid (Stein & Cuny, 1994).  However, the 
organization’s perspective on this solution was that their responsibility was to assist in the 
logistics and assistance involved with the physical action of return.  In practice, it became clear 
that return was not a simple concept, and that the event stretched over an extensive time period 
and carried significant implications for groups other than just returnees. 
 The UNHCR policy focused on promoting voluntary repatriation after there was an 
improvement of conditions in the country of origin (Bradley, 2013).  Tripartite agreements 
between the UNHCR, the country of origin, and the host country were one of the beginning steps 
to repatriation, where the agreement was to ensure that all parties were prepared for the returnees 
to go back.  In the latter half of the 1980s, High Commissioner Hocké spoke on voluntary 
repatriation in every address he gave.  The requirements of safety and dignity during and upon 
return, according to Bradley (2013), acted as characteristics to be satisfied on a checklist.  
However, the definitions of these concepts were not made clear, leading to significant variations 
in the implementation of policy.   
As promotion efforts developed, the role of the UNHCR was transformed and increased 
(Crisp & Long, 2016).  The organization attempted to implement a variety of practices to 
encourage refugees to return by their own volition, such as ending assistance in the host country 
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and reviewing the application of cessation clauses.  Monitoring and evaluation was prioritized in 
efforts to better operationalize the organization’s objectives in policy.  “Safe, imposed return”, as 
it was referred to, grew in popularity amongst states as host country’s struggled to bear the 
burden of refugees in developing regions.  However, this policy was criticized as a compromise 
of the voluntary aspect of repatriation, resulting in the UNHCR taking a step back from their 
practices.   
The Decade of Repatriation 
 The UNHCR declared the 1990s the ‘Decade of Repatriation’ due to the historically high 
numbers of refugees returning to their home countries (Hammond, 2014).  However, the 
complexity of repatriation policy implementation required a delegation of responsibilities 
extending beyond the UNHCR.  Over 90% of returns occurred outside of the scope of UNHCR 
efforts, resulting in high numbers of returnees moving without assistance from the international 
community (Stein & Cuny, 1994).   
 The focus of the international refugee regime shifted in the 1990s, moving from the right 
to leave towards the right to return (Black & Gent, 2006).  This promoted a widespread belief 
that all refugees maintained the conceptions of their homes developed when they had left, 
proving the power of a political statement from the refugee regime (Chimni, 2004).   
Politicization of Return  
 Under the stated policies and practices of the UNHCR, repatriation is required to be a 
voluntary event.  However, with interests from states, organizations, and refugees themselves 
often competing, misalignment of these interests has led to repeated occurrences of involuntary, 
forced, and coerced return (Wallace & Quiroz, 2008).  According to Hammond (2014), efforts 
are coordinated by the UNHCR to implement programs through agreements with the country of 
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origin and the host nation in order to provide accurate and full information to refugees that can 
be used to develop expectations for return.  However, these agreements are developed after the 
difficult determination is made of whether or not the root cause of migration has changed.  This 
decision may be made by a government with a vested interest in return, often neglecting the 
desires of the refugees.  Some refugees do not want to return, especially those in the second 
generation of their families in exile who view the host state as their true home.  Upon return, 
individuals may face discrimination or hostility from those who did not leave the country of 
origin.  Hammond (2014) warns that return may be a political effort to encourage an event that 
would not necessarily occur on its own, bringing into question whether or not the principle of 
non-refoulment is being upheld.  No international court has ever ruled that a violation of non-
refoulment occurred, even though there is consensus among experts that this has happened in 
numerous cases. 
The UNHCR’s interest in encouraging repatriation comes from the desire to solve 
problems and the ability for repatriation to justify the end of protection by the organization 
(Cwik, 2011).  Voluntary repatriation signals to the international community that the country of 
origin has changed.  However, Cwik (2011) argues that this cannot be the sole indicator that it is 
safe to return, as it would incentivize repatriation, even when it might harm refugee well-being.  
Politicization of this policy may also occur when state parties continually request reconsideration 
of conditions in the country of origin as this places pressure on the UNHCR to act and stretches 
thin resources that could otherwise be used to provide assistance. 
Tripartite agreements between the UNHCR, the host state, and the country of origin 
provide a written statement of changed conditions that are meant to signal to refugees that return 
is an option (Bradley, 2013).  However, even within these agreements, different interests jostle 
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for domination in order to increase their power and influence during and over the process of 
return.  Host countries often seek to get rid of the burden of refugees through repatriation, 
leading the well-being of refugees and countries of origin to be a forgotten subject in the 
conversation (Schmeidl, 2009). 
Return to a country of origin often occurs before a state has prepared to regain 
responsibility over the protection of a large population of returnees (Bradley, 2014).  As the 
burden grows on states with incoming returnees, they are often wrestling to maintain stability, 
unable to assume their role of protector of their population.  However, mass return can, on the 
other hand, be exploited by states as a demonstration of legitimacy and reform that signals to the 
international community that the state has successfully regained its footing after conflict. 
Countries of origin that do have the capacity to take back returnees stand to gain from the 
population increase, as a revival of skills and resources can boost productivity (Sinatti, 2015).  
As return validates the status of the country of origin, refugees themselves may doubt that the 
decision to return was fully their own (Black & Gent, 2006; Brown & Mansfield, 2009).  
According to Brown and Mansfield (2009), interviews with refugees revealed common feelings 
of disenfranchisement and coercion as refugees struggled to distinguish their own desires from 
the powerful opinions of the international community (Brown & Mansfield, 2009).  Chimni 
(2004) says that patterns suggest that the interests and decisions promoted by countries and the 
UNHCR are likely just accepted by refugees.  The states encouraging repatriation often operate 
behind a “humanitarian façade” that is an excuse for paternalism of refugees and the denial of 
their individual interests.    
Organizations and states working to solve refugee problems have devised increasingly 
questionable schemes to coerce refugees into return (Harild et al., 2015).  All parties involved 
15 
have changing interests and scholars have continued to question whether repatriation is in fact 
voluntary when refugees’ interests do not necessarily align with the loudest encouragers of 
repatriation. 
Blurry Objectives and Disappointing Outcomes 
 The lack of scholarly background spurring the transition towards a preference for the 
voluntary repatriation policy was reflected in practice with unclear targets and harmful 
outcomes.  The UNHCR focused primarily on the immediate step of physical return; however, in 
retrospect, many scholars argue that the role the organization should play goes beyond the short-
term efforts usually offered.  Wallace and Quiroz argue that there exists a misalignment between 
the aims of voluntary repatriation policy and the desired outcomes of the overarching durable 
solutions framework (Wallace & Quiroz, 2008).  According to their work, voluntary repatriation 
does not even act as a durable solution unless efforts are made to promote reintegration into the 
country of origin.  Without this crucial piece of the process, the policy stands a high chance of 
just changing the status of returnees to internally displaced people, which would, in the long run, 
only perpetuate weakness and instability in the country of origin that already exists.  As states 
emerge from conflict or seek to move forward from some event that drove individuals to flee, 
preemptive returns can be a “spoiling tactic” that hinders the establishment of peace and efforts 
to promote development (Milner & Loescher, 2011; Wallace & Quiroz, 2008).  Repatriation 
alone cannot be considered a solution to the plight of refugees if the mandate does not stretch 
beyond movement.  The authors also highlight the increased difficulties that are encountered by 
returnees in certain vulnerable populations, especially women and children (Wallace & Quiroz, 
2008).   
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 Hammond’s (2014) work draws on the significant relationship that exists between 
repatriation and development.  She argues for a “cross-mandate” that would stretch between 
United Nations organizations to help promote repatriation while working to break down the 
barriers that exist to development and utilize repatriation to help move the development process 
forward.  The UNHCR, thus far, has worked towards their mandate of protection; however, the 
focus must shift to implementing programs that will act as true durable solutions, especially as 
pressure on the international refugee regime increases.  According to the author, mass return is 
an unprecedented opportunity for development that the organization must consider as their end-
goal.  For refugees themselves, return is just a next step, opening up the possibility for new 
opportunities that policy has, so far, suffocated.  Refugees may precede to continue their 
movement, not truly settling upon return, and the author argues that this is not necessarily bad as 
it may assist in their handling of socio-economic struggle that exists in most nations that have 
recently experienced a mass population exodus.  The UNHCR must move beyond the logistical 
role they have played historically, critically examining their policies to work towards the 
provision of more effective, long-term assistance.  Currently, much of the aid being provided is 
poorly timed based on agricultural seasons, insufficient in amount, or provided too late in the 
repatriation process. 
 Critique among scholars is vast regarding the programs that do exist, as these programs 
have largely drained resources with little positive impact.  The insufficiency of assistance 
provided often manifests through continued migration based on the need and desire of returnees 
to find work (Brown & Mansfield, 2009).  For many refugees, they would prefer to receive 
livelihood assistance rather than assistance with reconstruction.  However, Brown and Mansfield 
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(2009) warn that repatriation assistance can be a source of new or renewed tension between 
returnees and the local communities that were not able, or never chose, to leave. 
 Recycling is a phenomenon commonly seen when repatriation leads to refugees 
becoming internally displaced people (Schmeidl, 2009).  If host country interests dominate the 
conversation on next steps, the best interests of refugees can be denied in favor of the promotion 
of return where the country of origin is not necessarily prepared for receipt.  One of the factors 
found to contribute to recycling is the perceived absence of autonomy by the refugee (Scalettaris, 
2009).  This perception can not only worsen conditions in the country of origin, but also can be a 
contributor to instability throughout the broader region (Schmeidl, 2009).  The frustration that 
festers amongst the returnees creates an environment conducive to easy recruitment for rebel 
groups in the country.  It is in the interest of all nations, host and origin, to promote repatriation 
only when the country of origin is prepared to retake their protection role over their population 
since lower numbers of refugees will be maintained in the existence of regional stability. 
 Chimni (2004) argues that the approach to repatriation assistance does not go beyond the 
bare minimum necessary to continue the promotion of the policy.  This likely is what leads many 
returnees to not take up aid, which also represents the obvious perception that many returnees 
have towards the effectiveness of UNHCR programs (Stein & Cuny, 1994).  The inability to 
improve their conditions upon return can threaten tenuous peace processes, exacerbating the 
likelihood of new conflicts.  According to Stein and Cuny (1994), repatriation is a chance to 
improve conditions of peace, stabilizing the country, and laying the groundwork for discussion 
and restitution amongst people on opposing sides of conflict.  Currently, inadequacy of programs 
is causing a violation of UNHCR responsibility to protect, as many refugees are forced to choose 
between “malnutrition and danger.”  The authors recognize the lack of consensus on what role 
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the UNHCR should play in development processes.  Repatriation and development are linked; 
however, with already strained resources for the organization, adding development as an 
objective could be difficult.  They cite the barriers to development in many refugee-producing 
nations that are too large for the UNHCR to tackle without overcommitting and underdelivering 
their resources and efforts.  The authors argue that return without development does not 
contradict the goals of solutions that are durable.  Even in the midst of dissatisfaction amongst 
returnees, efforts should target short-term, smaller projects that aim to achieve the bare minimum 
of self-sufficiency and protection for the population. 
Some scholars focus on the tensions that exist between returnees and local populations 
that don’t receive the same forms of assistance.  Bradley (2013) argues that perceptions of unfair 
provision of aid can create new conflicts.  Institutions must be well-established when repatriation 
occurs, in order to be capable of handling conflict that arises.  If grievances exist between locals 
or the national government and returnees, repatriation can cause these tensions to be swept under 
the rug, going undealt with and creating an unstable foundation for justice moving forward.  The 
danger exists for renewed violations of rights and problems that could result in new refugee 
movements, revealing a relationship that exists between repatriation and peace (Bradley, 2014). 
For many refugees, repatriation is the beginning of a new and dangerous journey.  Policy 
reflects incorrect assumptions that refugees view their country of origin with an unchanging 
conceptualization of home.  Voluntary repatriation promotes this by seeking to restore the former 
lives of refugees (Fagen, 2011).  However, as one review of Sri Lankan repatriation 
consequences reveals, the outcomes were overwhelmingly negative (George et al., 2016).  The 
economy struggled and livelihood establishment was minimal.  The government lacked the 
capacity or desire to support returnees and efforts to promote justice in the form of property 
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restitution did not exist, exacerbating trust issues that already existed.  Second generation 
refugees and children struggled to reintegrate, feeling a disconnection between their ethnic 
nation and the nation they had grown up in.  Black and Gent (2006) argue that repatriation must 
reflect the fact that people’s lives, desires, and perceptions change over time.  The UNHCR is 
wasting its resources trying to “re-root” returnees when changing their objectives to reflect an 
adapting population could leave countries of origin better off.  Returnees will continue to be 
mobile, moving between towns and nations in order to restore their families and economic status, 
and policy should reflect and respect this.  
Harild et al. (2015) calls for policy reform that reflects the intended outcomes of the 
durable solutions framework.  Actors must commit to collaboration, taking responsibility over 
implementation that respects the reality of political and economic instability, while promoting 
the well-being and desires of returnees.  
A Struggling International Refugee Regime 
 After the ‘Decade of Repatriation’ ended and the number of refugees repatriating began 
to decline, pressure on the UNHCR to pursue policies that better reflected the objectives of 
durable solutions increased.  In 2003, the organization presented an expanded view of the 
existing approach, referred to as the 4 Rs: repatriation, reintegration, rehabilitation, and 
reconstruction (Wallace & Quiroz, 2008).  This did not necessarily place a new responsibility on 
the UNHCR but sought to coordinate efforts amongst various invested organizations in order to 
better capture the impacts and opportunities from return.  However, practice and implementation 
of policy did not reflect any internalization of this approach.  It remains commonplace for 
humanitarian organizations, including the UNHCR, to implement short-term programs, 
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considering efforts complete well-before national governments are prepared to pursue lasting 
reform and improvement (Fagen, 2011). 
 Consensus continues to grow that voluntary repatriation alone will not succeed in solving 
refugee problems, as consequences leak into numerous facets of economic, political, and social 
life for entire regions (Harild & Christensen, 2010).  Programs must combat the pressure that 
repatriation places on the development process (Black & Gent, 2006).  The desire to see 
repatriation contribute to long-term, regional change has led scholars to begin building a 
foundation for sustainable refugee repatriation through research.  According to Harild et al. 
(2015), this entails the establishment of “adequate condition[s]” for returnees somewhere in the 
country of origin, specifically regarding “safety, housing, livelihoods and access to services that 
reduce the likelihood of secondary involuntary movement”.  The UNHCR-promoted process of 
voluntary return should immediately result in the beginning of efforts for “sustainable 
reintegration.” 
Promoting the Well-Being of the Refugee 
 The underlying assumption in the model of sustainable repatriation is that approaches 
hinge on the well-being of the refugee.  Organizations, especially the UNHCR, should work not 
only to respond to decisions and movements of refugees, but also to support the desires they 
expressed (Stein & Cuny, 1994).  Since an event causing an individual to gain refugee status is 
already harmful, efforts must reflect the desire to actively work towards meeting the needs of 
refugee populations during the process of repatriation.  Policy should assist in enforcing the 
stated notion that the state will face consequences for violations of their responsibilities towards 
their citizens (Bradley, 2013).   
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 As literature grows and the voices of refugees are heard over the often loud 
representation of states and organizations, the reality is becoming apparent that some refugees 
simply do not want to return to the life they had before their exile (Van Hear, 2006).  
Globalization has made a more transnational existence possible and beneficial for returnees as 
they transition back to their countries of origin (Sinatti, 2015).  This may represent a more 
plausible alternative to a permanent return that can limit the livelihood options for returnees. 
 As the UNHCR looks critically at their policies, they must consider the objective that 
should be prioritized over all: the well-being of the refugee (Black & Gent, 2006).  Decisions on 
whether or not to return can come as a result of considerations regarding the sustainability of 
repatriation.  However, promoting this option using coercion can jeopardize the ability for 
returnees to thrive.  Policy should reflect a respect for refugees as autonomous, responsible, and 
capable decision-makers that are able to consider the options available when making an informed 
decision regarding their return (Harild et al., 2015). 
Considering the Long-Run 
Since the 1990s, refugee returns have declined into the 21st century.  Scholars and 
practitioners are now seeing the long-run effects of mass return and digging into the underlying 
causes of particular outcomes.  However, although circumstances vary, particular phenomenons 
have arisen as common consequences of repatriation.  Secondary displacement is commonly 
seen amongst returnee populations; however, there is little consensus on whether or not it should 
be promoted or deterred.  Hammond (2014) argues that the ability for returnees to pursue 
numerous endeavors across different local, national, and international arenas can act as a risk 
management strategy.  Policymakers should consider life as a “revolving” returnee a valid means 
of survival since it is predominantly unassisted, but consistently remains pursued.  Since this 
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strategy has been helpful for many returnees thus far, the possibilities for benefit if this method is 
aided by the international community are large and could have broader positive implications for 
national and regional development.  Sinatti (2015) also argues that permanently returning to one 
place is not necessary for benefits of return to be reaped.  On the other hand, these gains are 
contingent on the systems in place that will hinder and aid migrants in their efforts to support 
development. 
According to Black and Gent (2006), both reconciliation and reconstruction are 
significantly impacted by reintegration processes.  The socioeconomic conditions and levels of 
violence that are seen in the year following return are both indicators that return will continue to 
be sustainable in the long-run.  Livelihoods are considered sustainable when they are no longer 
contingent on outside assistance and are able to handle any instability that may arise over time.  
They also recognize that returnees who do so voluntarily are much more likely to establish 
themselves and begin restarting their lives, compared to involuntary returnees who will struggle 
to establish the same level of income and avoid later displacement.  Amongst returnees who were 
assisted, their outcomes tend to be more positive, with increased income and stability in this 
population.  However, although some consequences are much more agreed upon in their impact 
on sustainability of return, the authors recognize that certain questions exist regarding how other 
outcomes should be measured and what standard they should be compared to in order to 
determine long-term objectives.   
Harild and Christensen (2010) are quick to criticize the focus on physical return as the 
objective of policy.  According to the authors, the sustainability of return plays a key role in 
whether or not return will actually be a durable solution to refugee populations.  Physical return 
does not itself guarantee that reintegration will occur; therefore, there must be a focus on the 
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conditions that exist before and upon return.  It is important that the international community 
recognize the dilemma of assisting in repatriation because of the fact that sustainability implies 
that the numbers of returnees needing assistance in the future will not only be those returning 
now, but also those that have returned in the years prior, who may struggle for years.  If 
voluntary repatriation is going to act as a durable solution, the focus must shift towards 
development and targeted assistance, as general repatriation packages alone will not be enough 
to push past the barriers that stand between return and reintegration. 
Sustainable return can also be defined as the occurrence of reintegration across areas of 
life once a refugee has returned to the country of origin and the ability to have safety and security 
(Koser & Kuschminder, 2017).  These authors argue, like others, that reintegration must occur 
for repatriation to have any long-term, beneficial purpose.  Economic reintegration should occur 
first so that the individual is able to establish a means of survival in the short term, before 
pursuing reintegration to social and cultural life that must occur in the long-run.  Political 
reintegration is also something that should be observed over longer periods of time as returnees 
are able to begin exercising their political rights as citizens and are newly afforded an adequate 
level of protection by the state. 
According to Wallace and Quiroz (2008), infrastructure and the economy should be the 
outcomes targeted by return.  As countries rise out of periods of conflict, repatriation assistance 
should focus on physical reconstruction of damaged infrastructure and reestablishing stability 
and activity in the economy.  Return can also be a driver of nation-building, which these authors 
define as institutional establishment and growth, and prevalence and growth of power of the law.  
Stability in the political and economic spheres that will come out of this will lead to later growth 
that can only occur if these prerequisites are established. 
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Rohwerder (2017) promotes objectives that capture a variety of viewpoints, arguing for 
both small- and large-scale projects that will promote sustainability of return.  Certain common 
issues, including, but not limited to, land restitution, livelihood reestablishment, and safety, 
should be pursued by the country of origin’s authorities who oversee return and the international 
community provide support.  Funding for proper and necessary levels of supports for these 
projects needs to be adequately distributed in a way that reflects that knowledge that sustainable 
return occurs over an extended period of time and the projects to aid returnees will impact 
successful reintegration of returnees. 
Internalizing Positive Externalities  
The literature is growing on the implications of repatriation on broader processes of 
development and regional stability.  Scholars are increasingly recognizing the event of mass 
return is not alone going to act as the durable solution that the UNHCR wants.  However, if 
return does lead to positive outcomes in the long-term, there may be uncaptured gains that could 
have huge benefits for development in post-conflict states and the overall well-being of nations 
throughout the regions where return is occurring.  Schmeidl (2009) states that the globalization 
seen over the past few decades must be reflected in policy by utilizing a “regionally based 
approach” to tackle problems.  A shift towards this from the current single state focus will 
provide much more success and benefit that will leak into the rest of the region. 
            The objective of any intervention made to impact post-conflict states should target the 
success and sustainability of that state over the long run (Wallace & Quiroz, 2008).  Key gains 
that can occur upon return for the state and the region include a population renewal that may help 
bolster legitimacy, the ability for the state to successfully reconstruct, and the ability to gauge 
how relations will heal over time between the state and returnees. 
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            Globalization has allowed people to witness a massive growth in the importance of 
transnationalism, especially for returnee populations.  This stands to benefit countries of origin 
and host countries through the relationships that refugees have established over time (Black & 
Gent, 2006).  These “linkages” that will be maintained between countries can act as a safety net 
for countries of origin who may face instability throughout the reconstruction period. 
            Harild and Christensen (2010) argue that return impacts development through human 
capital, the economy, the existence of poverty and efforts to target it, and a country’s 
environmental impact.  Return can have wide-reaching consequences for development; however, 
the relationship is not clear cut, as reverse causality likely also exists, where a country of origin’s 
level of development may also drive return (Harild et al., 2015).  This could create a positive 
feedback cycle, where higher rates of return encourage development, and more rapid 
development lead to further repatriations. 
Historical Context 
Rwanda 
The two biggest ethnic groups in Rwanda have lived with tension since colonization 
occurred, when the European colonizers disbursed a belief that the Tutsis were the superior 
ethnic group.  In 1994, the plane carrying the Rwandan and Burundian presidents was shot down, 
killing both men.  After this occurred, the underlying resentment held by Hutus came to light in 
the gruesome and horrific genocide that following throughout 1994.  This conflict contributed to 
the existing numbers of Rwandans living in exile from previous decades, with nearly 2 million 
Rwandans fleeing the country as refugees (UNHCR Centre for Documentation and Research, 
1998).  After the official end of the genocide, the UNHCR and numerous governments harboring 
refugees began an effort to repatriate Rwandan refugees that would last nearly 2 decades. 
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 As returnees arrived in Rwanda, UN organizations and the Rwandan government failed 
to fulfill the roles that had been laid out in existing agreements to carry out repatriation.  Funding 
that had been pledged to go towards repatriation efforts was delayed, resulting in a lack of 
services that were provided to new returnees (Kumar et al., 1996).  As a civil war began in 
neighboring Zaire, hundreds of thousands of Rwandans decided to return to Rwanda, fleeing the 
new conflict that they had become threatened by (UNHCR Centre for Documentation and 
Research, 1998).  Many people arrived at their old homes to find them inhabited by new people.  
As a resolution, some refugees were able to reacquire a third of their old land (Kessler & 
Boldrini, 2004).  Tensions existed between those who had never chosen or been able to leave 
Rwanda, as those living in exile attempting to come back (Kumar et al., 1996).  This only 
persisted as the government sought to limit opposition and develop a rigid ideal for membership 
in Rwandan society (Kingston, 2017). 
 In 2002, the UNHCR shifted their focus towards promoting repatriation, from the old 
approach of facilitation.  Coordinated mass repatriations continued into the 2000s.  In 2003, 
approximately 22,000 Rwandans returned under the UNHCR.  40,000 returnees followed in 
2004 (Kessler & Boldrini, 2004).  Although many returned, not all wanted to do so.  Many felt 
that Rwanda would not be safe; however, the pressure from host governments, Rwanda, and the 
UNHCR increased as agreements were made (Amnesty International, 2004).  The safety that 
returnees were guaranteed upon return did not appear to hold true in the aftermath of repatriation. 
 Human rights violations persisted upon the return of refugees (UNHCR Centre for 
Documentation and Research, 1998).  Rwanda’s primitive judicial system was not equipped to 
manage crimes against humanity and genocide, and the UNHCR failed to assist in their efforts 
(Amnesty International, 2004).  Therefore, most crimes committed were informally tried in 
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gacaca courts run primarily by citizens, providing more closure than justice (Gourevitch, 2009).  
Thousands of extrajudicial killings occurred in the years after the war.  Innocent civilians and 
humanitarian workers were killed by government-backed forces.  Hundreds of thousands of 
people were arrested and imprisoned arbitrarily (UNHCR Centre for Documentation and 
Research, 1998).  The illegality of hate speech was manipulated to suppress government 
opposition and freedom of speech and expression (Kingston, 2017). 
 Nearly a decade later, in 2013, it was determined that the circumstances in Rwanda that 
had caused its citizens to leave had finally ended and the cessation clause was to be invoked.  
Approximately 70,000 refugees faced the ultimatum to return to Rwanda or to remain abroad and 
risk deportation or statelessness (Amnesty International, 2004).  Amidst some successful efforts 
to develop the economy and pursue reconciliation, reports of persecution and human rights 
violations continued with cessation (Kingston, 2017).  On the other hand, returnees were 
promised public services, documentation, and amenities.  However, few of these promises were 
upheld.  Rwanda also faced a significant struggle in working towards the coexistence of former 
fighters with the other returnees.  Ingando camps were created in order to retrain many of these 
people; however, after their return, many former soldiers received little assistance, which 
contributed to high crime rates amongst this group, following their repatriation (Amnesty 
International, 2004; Kingston, 2017).   
The return that many Rwandans experienced occurred in circumstances of continued 
conflict, lack of reconciliation, and a failure of government to fully assume the protection role 
over their people.  Efforts by the UNHCR and host countries, and circumstances forcing many 
people to return, showed the misinformation regarding the conditions in Rwanda and led to high 
risks or loss of life for many returnees. 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
The Bosnian War was the culmination of decades of ethnic tension that had existed 
between Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs (Burg & Shoup, 1999).  As the former Yugoslavia grew 
weaker, in 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared their independence as a state (Taylor, 2012).  
The lack of a majority ethnic group meant that three minority groups were vying for power in 
attempts to determine a system of rights and state power, which were all clouded by conflicting 
interests (Burg and Shoup, 1999).  The declaration of independence plunged the state into a 
brutal civil war, with horrific targeting and ethnic cleansing occurring against each minority 
group, by the others (Taylor, 2012).  Millions of people fled the violence and persecution, while 
thousands of others were forcibly deported, throughout the four years of war lasting until 1995 
(Kovac, 2000; UNHCR, 1996).  In 1995, a peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina was signed, 
where, among other guidelines for peace, the UNHCR was granted authority over the 
repatriation efforts that would follow (UNHCR, 1996). 
 Calls for repatriation began growing from the international community upon the signing 
of the Dayton Peace Agreement, although nationalist leaders continued to hold power around the 
country, disincentivizing any return from minorities who had, soon before, fled for their lives 
(Kovac, 2000).  In 1996, the UNHCR was in the process of implementing repatriation programs 
for refugees and other displaced peoples (UNHCR, 1996).  Certain hosting nations were 
requested to maintain temporary protection over those in exile while the UNHCR set up 
measures to protect human rights.  Elections set to occur soon after the peace agreement were 
supposed to represent a further confirmation that the peace process was progressing and return 
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was safe.  Assistance was to be given to returnees under the UNHCR and reintegration, 
particularly for minorities, would be a closely monitored process. 
 Thousands of refugees repatriated into the early 2000s (Kovac, 2000).  However, many 
faced extremely harsh circumstances upon return.  Significant violence against minority 
returnees continued (Research Directorate, 2000).  A church was destroyed in 2000 and there 
were reports of newly planted land mines, targeting minorities.  Transportation for returnees was 
coordinated between the UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration (UNHCR, 
1996).  Upon arrival, people faced shortages or absence of electricity, medical facilities, food, 
and shelter (Research Directorate, 2000).  A majority of returnees were unable to return to their 
original homes because they had been taken by others or destroyed. 
 Throughout the peace process, the removal of genocidaires, war criminals, and other 
military forces was slow, inhibiting returnees (Blitz, 1999).  Political leaders lacked the will to 
commit to the extensive return assistance that was needed.  Human rights were not effectively 
protected by any institution.  Illegal taxes, harassment, and lack of access to documentation were 
commonly reported amongst returnees.  During return proceedings, the government and police 
proved incapable, or unwilling, to resume the protection role for returnees that was necessary for 
the UNHCR to deem the situation was safe according to their policies (Research Directorate, 
2000). 
 The unimpressive outcomes from the repatriation programs in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
were, in part, a result of a dire funding crisis at the UNHCR.  The program designers included 
plans for projects to assist with repatriation and reintegration; however, in 2000, the UNHCR 
was nearly $150 million short of the funding that they had requested (Kovac, 2000).  The 
organization was forced to abandon plans for more impactful projects, in order to use their 
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inadequate funds for shelters and the provision of immediate, emergency needs of returnees and 
remaining refugees.  This resulted in a hindered ability to make any long-term investments in 
development or reintegration in certain regions in and around Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Chapter 3: Research Design 
As stated earlier, this study seeks to use qualitative to explore the UNHCR’s preference 
towards refugee repatriation and analyze the appropriateness of such approach today.  In order to 
answer the research question, this thesis will answer 4 sub questions.  First, why has the UNHCR 
preferred repatriation as a durable solution, and what are the intended objectives?  Second, how 
does the UNHCR balance the invested interests in refugee return?  Third, what are the common 
consequences in the aftermath of repatriation, and what response has been warranted?  Finally, 
what procedures regarding program design, monitoring, and evaluation are used for repatriation 
and how has this impacted the UNHCR’s behavior?  By answering these questions, this broader 
research question will develop a deeper understanding of UNHCR action and policy choices. 
 In efforts to build from the foundation of existing literature, primary data was gathered in 
the form of 7 Key Informant Interviews.  Primarily, findings are a compilation of 5 of these 
interviews, because 2 of the Informants lacked the authority to speak about repatriation.  
Informants at the UNHCR were senior-level protection and evaluation officials, a human rights 
attorney, a regional representative, and a senior officer.  Informants outside of the UNHCR 
included a law professor and an expert on migration studies.   
 This research design has strategic strengths for the purpose of answering the stated 
research question.  First, the absence of reliable quantitative data favors a qualitative approach, 
particularly since much of the quantitative data available is conflicting or only covering a very 
short period of time.  Interviews allowed for this study to recognize and expand upon the vast 
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nuance that is present in the different aspects of this research question.  The promotion of 
repatriation and the UNHCR’s respective behavior simply could not be simplified or isolated to a 
single relationship.  This format is best suited to show the numerous impacts of repatriation 
resulting from a combination of many observable and unobservable factors, not a single causal 
relationship (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1990).  The questions being asked call for 
explanations that require an understanding and record of decades of practice, which could only 
be answered by experienced professionals.  In providing a broad scoped study, this research will 
contribute to the literature by providing context-dependent knowledge that has not previously 
been known or understood (Bartlett & Vavrus, 2017; Flyvbjerg, 2010). 
Methods and Data 
Hour long interviews were conducted by phone, utilizing the interview guide listed in the 
Appendix. These were semi-structured, in order to allow for comparison of responses, whilst 
leaving space for each expert to expand their responses based on their own professional 
experience and areas of expertise.  A combination of open- and close-ended questions allowed 
for interviewees to explain their responses, while also keeping the interviews focused and 
comparable in order to aid in answering the research questions (Harvey, 2011).  Interviews 
created a depth to the findings of this study that could only have been accumulated from the 
extensive first-hand experience of professionals involved with, or well-acquainted with, the 
practice and policy at UNHCR.  Interviews were recorded with the permission of each 
interviewee.  In order to maximize efficiency and effectiveness, a variety of literature and 
experienced researchers assisted in developing interview guides in order to best target the 
objectives of this particular research project. 
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 Key Informants were selected through research into the UNHCR and, specifically, 
publications regarding UNHCR repatriation policy.  Authors of a variety of publications were 
contacted about the potential of carrying out an interview in contribution to this project.  During 
the initial contact, snowballing was implemented, where individuals were asked to recommend 
or connect the research with other individuals with the expertise to participate (Harvey, 2011).  
Interviewees were informed about the larger research question and the specific role that their 
interviews would play in the analysis.  Prior to each respective interview, respondents each 
received a copy of the interview guide.  Respondents were told that they would remain 
anonymous in order to allow them to speak more freely if they did have any negative comments 
that they were not willing to speak about publicly. 
 Conducting Key Informant Interviews allows for significant depth to the findings that 
would be difficult to obtain using other methods (Kumar, 1989).  They also allowed for a deeper 
understanding of relationships that exist, expanding upon the reasons that policies are in place.  
This method also allowed for a broad time period to be explained. This will help bring clarity to 
where, if any, intention and action are misaligned, allowing for more insightful and effective 
progress to be made. 
Using interviews as the only form of data brings a number of limitations to this study, as 
well.  First, interviews are subject to bias on the part of the interviewer and the interviewee 
(Kumar, 1989).  Interviewer bias has been addressed through the development of interview 
guides to be utilized in every interview.  Bias from the interviewee will be recognized if evident 
through rigorous fact checking and corroboration of evidence presented; however, this method 
cannot eliminate all bias.  Similarly, the small number of respondents will limit that 
corroboration possible, and, further, the validity of responses (Kumar, 1989).  Given the time and 
33 
monetary resources available to the researcher, 10 interviews were deemed an appropriate 
number for this study, while only 7 were able to be completed.  The primary limitation is that the 
data collected is solely qualitative and is limited in the comparison that can be made across 
responses. However, the expertise of informants grants them a high level of authority to speak in 
regards to repatriation and the UNHCR.  On the other hand, no effort has been made to quantify 
the open-ended responses because the researcher would risk falsely classifying and presenting 
information (Harvey, 2011).  These are just a few key limitations of this method; however, the 
researcher determined that with the resources available, this was the best possible design for this 
study. 
Chapter 4: Results 
 Interviews provide extremely important and useful insight into why the UNHCR 
continues to promote repatriation, the problems that have been seen, and how the UNHCR needs 
to move forward in reforming their repatriation policy.  The number one thing that interviewees 
believe about why the UNHCR continues to promote repatriation as the preferred durable 
solution comes out of apophatic reasoning.  Host countries, in many cases, feel that they bear a 
much larger burden from refugees than any other group.  After often hosting refugees for 
decades at a time, local integration is not an option that host countries feel they can entertain.  
Not only do they feel that they lack the capacity to naturalize refugees, but they also do not see 
this as acceptable amongst the population and political bodies.  In order to avoid unrest, it does 
not seem possible for local integration to be a reasonable solution.  On the other hand, 
resettlement proves to be a solution for only a select number of refugees.  Typically, what has 
been seen is the rich countries in the global North want to avoid bearing a physical burden from 
taking in refugees.  Therefore, instead of increasing their resettlement quotas, these countries put 
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money into organizations like the UNHCR so that they can hopefully solve the plight of refugees 
with minimal other involvement from the global North.  Particularly, respondent D mentions, as 
the Trump administration has implemented policy reforms, resettlement quotas have fallen as the 
numbers of refugees continue to rise.  Therefore, both local integration and resettlement do not 
seem like options that can be reasonably considered as options for the millions of refugees that 
hold status today. 
 Since local integration and resettlement are not feasible solutions for large numbers of 
people, the UNHCR is left with the final durable solution that is repatriation.  Respondent A 
notes, “The reality of it is that resettlement is limited, local integration is limited, return to the 
country of origin, when it’s safe to do so is actually the most feasible of the 3 durable solutions.” 
Repatriation, therefore, ends up as the preferred solution of the three, not because it is the best or 
the most desired, but because the organization feels it lacks another option. 
 Interviewees mention that one reason this policy is preferred is because this was what the 
UNHCR, from its experience, believes that refugees want.  Respondent A argues that the 
organization’s work with these individuals reveals that, above all, they wanted to return to their 
home countries.  However, this same argument is opposed by respondents B and D.  As noted by 
respondent D, the UNHCR uses this argument to exaggerate the necessity of repatriation, 
although the respondent believes they are incorrect in doing so. 
 Respondent B shares a similar review to C and D, stating that “it is probably quite 
transparently about politics and money.”  The UNHCR is required to find a balance between 
appeasing the leaders of host countries in order to, at minimum, be present in those countries to 
provide safety, security, and resources to refugees.  On the other hand, the organization must 
show the donor countries that it is carrying out its mission while also minimizing their burden, in 
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order to maintain the relationships that it relies on for funding.  Respondent D states that the 
organization has a “chronic funding crisis” and repatriation reduces some of the organization’s 
financial pressures.  After considering all of these factors, repatriation is the only feasible option.  
This minimizes the burden for host countries, so that the UNHCR can maintain their 
relationships with them, while simultaneously minimizing the burden on wealthy countries, in 
order to maintain flows of funds.  This line of reasoning emphasizes that repatriation is not 
necessarily the policy that is thought of as the best for refugees; however, the organization faces 
a variety of pressure from conflicting parties that is forcing it to settle for this solution. 
 Consensus on what the goal of the UNHCR’s policy is minimal.  Respondents vary on 
their viewpoints as to whether the policy is focused on the external pressure on the organization, 
the process of return of refugees, or the conditions during and upon return.  Respondents B and C 
believe that the ultimate goal of the policy is primarily to save face for the organization.  
Respondent B notes that by having and reforming a repatriation policy, the organization is 
recognizing that they are aware that problems have occurred and, particularly after 1995 and the 
Rwandan repatriation, that the international community is aware.  Therefore, the goal is to 
provide guidance for the future while simultaneously acknowledging that the organization is 
working on it. 
 Four respondents agree that the primary goal of the policy is to end the exile of refugees.  
The organization operates under two mandates: protection for refugees and durable solutions.  
Specifically, the organization’s goal is to allow refugees to return in safety, security, and dignity.  
This protection role is very important, as respondents A, C, and D feel that the UNHCR’s 
preferred timing of return is often superseded by the desires of host countries and wealthy donor 
nations.  Respondent A says regarding past repatriations that “There was no choice anyway 
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because they were going to be sent back, so the best way to do it was in a way that guaranteed 
their security and safety.”  Therefore, the organization is working to maximize the safety, 
security, and dignity of return, in whatever time frame they are forced to work within.  This 
action also applies to cases when cessation clauses are enacted.  In these cases, in particular, the 
voluntary nature of repatriation no longer truly applies, so the UNHCR must do the best that they 
can to protect refugees in the midst of involuntary circumstances. 
 Respondents A, B, and D mention goals that go beyond the time that returnees arrive in 
their home countries and leave the immediate purview of the UNHCR.  The growing literature 
on sustainable reintegration is mentioned by two respondents as being an important focus of the 
organization.  These respondents feel that reintegration into the country of origin was the true 
goal of repatriation.  However, reintegration is mentioned in conjunction with conflicting views 
of later migration.  Respondent C feels that the long-term goal was for refugees to return and not 
migrate again.  No response is made to the literature that exists about the benefits of secondary 
displacement, other than the fact that, as practitioners, overgeneralization may not be useful.  
However, respondents B and D feel that the idea of trying to prevent future movement strips 
people of their agency and their ability to make migration decisions and fails to recognize that 
refugees often change significantly while in exile. 
 Some respondents feel that to speak of an ideal outcome for after return is to speak of an 
outcome that does not exist.  Respondent C’s view that the ideal is impossible is in part due to 
the difficulty of combatting the many obstacles that returnees face in their countries of origin.  
However, respondents A, B, and D believe it is the conditions prior to repatriation that are what 
seem to be causing the biggest problems.  The refugees themselves have little input as to when 
they return.  Even when returns are voluntary, external pressure from host countries, the 
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UNHCR, or other parties is often encouraging that return.  Therefore, the level of choice and 
decision-making available to the refugee is minimal.  Henceforth, to speak of an ideal is to speak 
of a scenario that is impossible to carry out. 
 Other respondents are more hopeful about the subject.  Respondent D feels it is important 
for the returnees to go to places where integration and reestablishment are feasible, even if that 
place is not where they came from initially.  This conflicts respondent C’s view that the ideal 
would be for returnees to go to their homes, regain their property, and reintegrate into their 
original towns and villages.  Respondent D recognizes that, for years, the UNHCR believed the 
ideal was a return to the initial home where refugees fled from.  However, D recognized that the 
organization's knowledge has changed and there is now a widespread belief that refugees can 
change significantly while in the asylum country.  The expectation has shifted to more generally 
encourage refugees to settle somewhere in the country of origin.  These scenarios point to the 
broader subject of sustainable reintegration, particularly considering that the process looks very 
different for each individual.   
 Respondent B is more abstract, focusing on the rights of refugees and the function of 
institutions in the country of origin.  One ideal scenario is that a person is able to make whatever 
choice they want, without pressure, and that they are able to carry out that choice.  However, this 
respondent mentions that the feasibility of this is low, considering this is something people are 
hindered from around the world, not solely refugees.  Upon hearing this prompt, the respondent 
states, “We can’t talk about what the ideal scenario for going home would be like unless we talk 
about the ideal scenario for remaining where you are or going somewhere else.” Speaking of 
ideal scenarios for return warrant the exploration of the ideal scenarios before people become 
refugees and the ideal scenarios for not returning to their country of origin.  To consider this 
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alternative is potentially forcing the organization to recognize that repatriation is not the best 
solution. 
 Respondents’ answers about common problems after repatriation often are related to their 
respective jobs and roles within the refugee system.  However, there is some overlap throughout 
as many responses fall in the theme of less than ideal circumstance.  Respondent ____ notes that 
“Refugees repatriate in circumstances which are still uncertain, where there are issues associated 
with their reintegration into the communities they came from, and quite often, refugees have 
lived 20 plus years outside their own country.”  One problem that arises in multiple interviews is 
that conflict is often not fully resolved when repatriation happens.  A symptom of this is seen in 
the lack of acceptance of refugees amongst their home populations, particularly among the 
people that never left.  This not only threatens the safety of refugees and the security of countries 
of origin, but is also problematic as previously warring groups of people are abruptly beginning 
to try and live alongside each other.  This tension can slow or complicate efforts to promote the 
reconciliation that is necessary for peace to be maintained in the future. 
 There are also a number of more physical problems mentioned.  First, often returnees’ 
homes have been destroyed and they find out only when they have arrived in their original 
villages and towns.  Also, refugees often spend decades in exile, and, therefore, are acclimated to 
an urban environment.  Upon return to their rural villages, many returnees struggle with the lack 
of access to resources that are more readily available in urban areas, including medical care and 
educational facilities.  Some individuals facing this decide to move to cities; however, their 
plight usually continues as they become a part of the urban poor, living on the margins of their 
country of origins’ cities.  In other situations, returnees are forced to move again, either 
becoming internally displaced peoples or refugees, again. 
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 Respondent D notes that the UNHCR plays a supportive role during repatriation, but 
afterwards, considers their responsibilities fulfilled.  Most returnees are not properly prepared for 
or assisted with the obstacles that exist upon return.  Therefore, significant difficulties result in 
establishing livelihoods, handling tension between generations that are unequally acquainted 
with the country of origin, and continuing human rights violations. 
 From a rights-based perspective, respondent B expresses concern about the role of 
women and the lack of focus on the sets of rights that returnees have under the broader human 
rights framework.  The role of women often changes as refugees are in exile, especially after a 
war where many men have fought, and potentially been killed.  These women learn to live with 
new norms and those norms are challenged when they return to their countries of origin.  There 
also should be greater concern about the rights that returnees have, but are forgotten since they 
are refugees.  In particular, the UNHCR can be so narrow-sighted that they do not properly 
consider the fact that returnees’ civil and political, and economic, social, and cultural rights are 
not upheld.  By focusing on the essentials, refugees are often afforded a set of rights less than 
those of any other human beings. 
 Respondents A and C agree that the UNHCR is doing the best they can to balance the 
competing interests of refugees, host countries, and countries of origin.  In many scenarios, the 
UNHCR does not have the power to promote their preferences for what they believe to be best 
over the interests of political influences and donors.  Countries will do what they have set out to 
do; therefore, it is the UNHCR’s job to fulfill their mandate to protect refugees amidst the 
circumstances that often violate the voluntary principle of repatriation.  However, the 
organization must realistically face the power that is often encouraging repatriation.  Host 
countries and their populations are often set on moving a population of refugees out of their 
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country.  The UNHCR has privileged access to these countries so that they can provide 
humanitarian care and they do not want to jeopardize this relationship.  In general, the 
organization must do what they are able to protect refugees, regardless of what is occurring 
around and to them by these countries. 
 There is recognition that, depending on which party was asked, opinions about the 
UNHCR’s balance of priorities will vary.  Donor countries of the UNHCR are not mentioned in 
the question, however, respondents B, C, and D recognize that even these countries, contributing 
financial assets to the organization, bear very different priorities than those of refugees.  
Therefore, the UNHCR often finds itself attempting to coax the global North into a higher level 
of participation, rather than allowing these countries to settle with relatively meager financial 
contributions. 
 Respondent B states that we need refugee priorities to be at the forefront.  However, the 
traditional impulse to provide humanitarian services is stripping refugees of their agency.  There 
is little consideration of refugees as rights-holders, capable of advocating for their own needs and 
interests.  Therefore, the organization tends to feel that they have to assume this role for them.  
This respondent cites tripartite country agreements and the refugee swap in Europe to be prime 
examples of this problem.  People tend to go along with these policies, in part because they align 
with the priorities of the most powerful political forces and also because no one dares to speak 
out against them.  However, these policies, in the respondent’s opinion, violate the Refugee 
Convention and push against any view of refugees as individual agents with their own power. 
 Respondent D states that the biggest prevention of premature repatriation stems from 
refugees’ unwillingness to compromise in certain situations.  Particular refugee populations, 
specifically the Rohingya refugees, have refused to return to their country of origin until there is 
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a significant change that occurs.  Two respondents agree that the level of consultation with 
refugees that occurs needs to change in order to give refugees greater power over the decisions 
being made.  One place where respondent D feels that the UNHCR is manipulating their role in 
the refugee system is in the organizations tendency to act as the speaker for refugees.  
Particularly, in stating that they are “the voice of the voiceless” and using the social media 
handle, @refugees, the organization is failing to recognize their role accurately.  In order to 
change this, the UNHCR must recognize that refugees are people who have rights and voices that 
the organization does not always representative correctly. 
 In questions regarding the monitoring and evaluation of repatriation programs, four 
respondents are blatant about the fact that evaluation has not been a priority in the past.  They do 
acknowledge the fact that, to this day, things are changing, and the organization is in the process 
of looking at how evaluation should occur.  Respondent E mentions that the UNHCR is unsure 
of how to incorporate evaluation into the organization, as it struggles to balance evaluation of 
programs with implementation of formal and informal missions, often just working to meet 
emergency needs.  One reason they purport for why evaluation is often not done is that there are 
usually other organizations in the region of a repatriation that are monitoring and evaluating what 
occurring.  However, the UNHCR is a “hegemonic organization” and often does not listen to 
criticism or suggestions from outsiders, according to respondent D.  They need to establish 
principles to govern operations, rather than maintaining the somewhat “laissez-faire” principle of 
policy-making that exists.   
 Respondent A is sure that evaluation is valued within the organization; however, this 
person is unsure of how evaluation is used and whether or not it actually influences policy or 
program decisions.  Respondent B shares that evaluation only started to be used in the 1990s 
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after information about what was going wrong in UNHCR repatriation programs was made 
public.  As soon as the public was aware, the organization felt obligated to carry out evaluation 
in order to appease the public scrutiny and show that they recognized what was going on and 
were searching for answers.  Around 2013, according to respondent D, policy and evaluation 
separated, moving the organization away from using evaluation to help mold policy.  Now, 
academic research does not influence the organization’s policies or programs.  It is hard to create 
change using research; however, it is nearly impossible when sourced from people outside of the 
organization.  There is a general priority of inside research compared to that of other parties. 
 Respondent D states that the desire to carry out evaluation existed during their time at the 
UNHCR.  However, the biggest problem is that there was no system to ensure that lessons 
learned in the past are used in developing programs for current or future repatriations.  The 
problem is one of culture, which is mentioned by three respondents, in which, as respondent 
____ says, “There’s a bit of a tendency to treat each new repatriation operation as an entirely 
new one, without granting that many lessons can be learned from the past.”  It is important to 
recognize that to argue the uniqueness of each repatriation is not unfounded, however, there is no 
consideration that this could be incorrect.  Amongst staff, managers oversee the design of 
programs, and there is no established way to sanction them for failing to use prior evaluation. 
 A common problem that interviewees mention is that the UNHCR has no independent 
body that can receive and handle complaints objectively.  Respondent B states that “They’re kind 
of judge, jury, and executioner in some contexts.  So, if I complain about my housing, I’m 
complaining to the same person who is in charge of my resettlement application.”  This structure 
not only disincentivizes action, but also disincentivizes people, particularly refugees themselves, 
from ever coming forward with concerns or problems with the organization’s repatriation 
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program and its implementation.  If people do choose to come forward, there is little 
accountability for the UNHCR to respond to problems that are brought to their attention.  The 
organization has no incentive to respond to complaints or to release complaints to the public, 
shielding the UNHCR from criticism. 
 Respondents are eager to suggest various ways that the organization can move towards a 
system ready to regularly reform policy, according to program evaluations.  Some of these ideas 
are concrete, while others are more abstract.  First, respondent B says there must be unanimous 
opposition to policies such as tripartite country agreements and refugee swaps.  These are 
contradictory to a belief of refugees as individuals capable of making rational decisions.  It is 
necessary to shift the perspective away from the attention of political power and towards 
refugees as equal human beings, who are entitled to the same human rights as every other human 
being.  Second, according to respondents B and F, the organization needs to work towards the 
establishment of an independent treaty-like mechanism that provides the neutrality that is 
necessary in the disputes and complaints process.  This allows for complaints to be brought 
forward without a risk of harm to or backlash against refugees.  With a neutral body, issues can 
be required to be investigated and addressed, and the organization has no choice but to respond 
with an explanation, change, or both. 
 There must be a move towards recognition of refugees as rights-holders who have 
agency.  Sustainable reintegration will only come from people migrating out of choice, not 
necessity.  However, it is acknowledged that there are significant structural barriers that stand in 
the way of refugees having full agency, as well as the inequality that forces migration to occur in 
the first place, as respondent B notes.  For much of this to change, the respondent cites great 
social movements like women’s’ rights and civil rights to recognize that what is needed is a 
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refugee social movement.  It is necessary for refugees to be capable and allowed to advocate for 
themselves and what they need and want. 
 According to respondent D, in the past few years, there have been efforts to increase 
information sharing amongst evaluation units.  Although little has changed in practice, there is a 
growing desire to increase the impact that organizations and their evaluations are having.  One 
example of the manifestation of these efforts was ALNAP, a network where evaluation units 
from different organizations can share their findings.  The UNHCR needs to create frameworks 
and policies to take advantage of the information available regarding evaluations of repatriation 
programs from within and outside of their organization.  By creating well-developed policies that 
guide program development, the expectation to use evaluation will be established, changing the 
culture of the UNHCR over time, and potentially, leading to policies informed by evidence and 
history. 
Chapter 5: Recommendations and Conclusions 
The information gained from the Key Informants sheds light on significant cracks in the 
refugee system sourcing from the role of the UNHCR.  In regards to repatriation, it is clear that 
there are consistent problems that have resulted after refugees have returned and efforts are not 
being delegated towards avoiding the repetition of history.  In various regions around the world, 
refugees have repeatedly endured harm as a result of returning to their countries of origin, often 
prematurely or in less than ideal circumstances.  Returnees face violations of their rights, 
poverty, and often continued conflict.  Amidst these dire circumstances, the UNHCR’s preferred 
solution to the refugee problem leaves returnees with little or no support as they attempt to 
reintegrate into their countries of origin, often after decades in exile. 
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Interviews reinforce the extensive literature that emphasizes that repatriation that occurs 
today often does not coincide with the “voluntary repatriation” that continues to be promoted in 
policy.  The organization perpetually promotes a stance that refugees desire return; however, this 
is coming to light as an exaggeration of grave consequence.  Ultimatums, political power, and 
financial will continue to be the determinants of return, forcing millions to reluctantly return to 
their countries of origin. 
It is clear that the role the UNHCR has played in promoting voluntary repatriation as the 
preferred solution has influenced the functioning of the refugee system.  The lack of political will 
to back local integration and the lack of financial will to back resettlement has crippled the 
organization’s ability to navigate the durable solutions framework in a practical and realistic 
manner.  Therefore, they continue to purport a solution that has proven to have large 
ramifications, often negative, for entire regions and people groups. 
Evaluation at the UNHCR continues to take the back seat to the organization’s 
operations.  Consensus on whether or not evaluation is even conducted is rare.  However, even 
where it exists, there is little motive for its use.  The organization has failed to consider that 
repatriation may not be the best solution for refugees and that benefits may be huge if the 
organization is willing to consider other policy options.  Organizations around the world are 
independently conducting evaluations of repatriation programs; however, the UNHCR has been 
very reluctant to take note of them.  
There is not a precedent at the UNHCR for using the lessons learned in past programs in 
order to develop the next repatriation program.  This is a problem of organizational culture.  
There must be an institutional change that promotes the need to look at repatriation critically, 
with a willingness to open their eyes to the true possibilities for success and risks of failure for 
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this policy.  It is true that every repatriation is unique.  However, as demonstrated by the 
consistency in problems that have arisen, the UNHCR could potentially combat pitfalls of 
repatriation that have repeatedly occurred for decades, with a newfound investment in evaluation 
programs.  In order to move towards repatriations that actually lead towards substantive and 
good lives for returnees, the organization can and should use must move beyond the inertia that 
exists in the preference for repatriation, recognizing that the well-being of the refugee should be 
the forefront of policy in the refugee system. 
Today, it is evident that repatriation is not working as a durable solution in many areas 
around the world.  The organization must face the reality that their repatriation programs lack 
objective or beneficial and sustainable long-term outcome goals.  The UNHCR continues to be 
pushed around by conflicting interests, incapable of facing the grim reality that the durable 
solutions framework is failing to fulfil the needs of over 20 million refugees around the world. 
There is change happening right now, with efforts in progress to change policies regarding 
UNHCR operations, specifically about evaluation.  However, the reforms, according to 
Informants, are routine, and it’s doubtful that these will lead to a change that will impact 
program development or lead to evidence-informed policies. 
This project set out to investigate the UNHCR’s preference for voluntary repatriation in 
the durable solutions framework, and to suggest whether or not this approach is best with the 
current realities of the refugee system.  The organization is working to balance a number of 
conflicting interests that are also invested in various ways in the future of the organization and 
refugees.  Repatriation remains the organization’s preferred solution, but not necessarily because 
it is the best policy.  There are significant problems that occur during and in the aftermath of 
repatriation, and currently, no action is being made to prevent their recurrence.  Evaluation is not 
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a routine practice, and, if completed, is conducted without objective for its use.  As a potential 
result, the lessons learned from repatriation programs at the UNHCR are not being used to 
improve programs in the future; however, a change in system that exists right now could lead to 
positive reforms of policy that prioritizes the well-being of the refugee. 
Limitations and Generalizability 
The findings of this study are limited in accuracy and validity due to the sample size, 
potential for bias, and limited dialogue between participants.  This project compiled the 
information gained from 7 scholars and experts in refugee policy.  Five of these interviews were 
used heavily, with a smaller emphasis on 2, in which interviewees knowledge was less relevant 
and authoritative in regards to the research question.  The inability to carry out more interviews 
limited that amount of information obtained and the ability for the researcher to compare 
findings across interviews.  Although most interviewees have held professional roles related to 
refugee repatriation, some spoke on topics slightly outside of their expertise, potentially 
stretching the accuracy of the information that they were able to provide.  It is important to 
recognize that bias could have influenced the informant’s responses, particularly if there is any 
negative history with the UNHCR.  Similarly, it is possible that some of the information shared, 
either intentionally or unintentionally, was hyperbole, assumed, or misstated.  Another limitation 
of this study was the inability for informants to speak to what was said by the others.  This 
dialogue could have helped corroborate findings or allowed for disagreement between 
informants.   
Although this study faced numerous constraints, findings are still very applicable and 
useful to the functionings of the UNHCR and are insightful for the refugee system.  The results 
are relatively broad and could be used to inform organizational frameworks and principles that 
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can guide operations in a variety of policy areas beyond repatriation.  All Informants were 
chosen because of their professional contributions to the refugee system.  All held high-level 
positions, including multiple senior staffers at the UNHCR or other well-known organizations 
within the refugee system.  With the combination of a wealth of experience and a variety of 
expertise areas, informants have significant authority to speak and inform refugee policy through 
these findings. 
Recommendations 
Key Informants shared a number of policy recommendations that could be used to 
increase and change the evaluation and reform mechanisms that exist at the UNHCR.  First, the 
organization should support calls for the development of an independent complaints body.  This 
would allow for anyone, but predominantly refugees, to have a forum to bring forward concerns, 
complaints, and suggestions for the organization without having to face the possibility of 
retribution.  Since the UNHCR is the predominant organization in providing care, governance, 
and guidance for refugees, there exist significant disincentives to providing honest evaluation to 
the organization because all evaluation must go directly to the organization.  Creating an 
independent body to hear evaluation and complaints would increase the discussion that occurs 
between refugees and organizations about what should and needs to change. 
Informants also suggested that the UNHCR should work to increase the influence that 
refugees are having on policies and programs.  Currently, there is little voice given to refugees, 
but a widely held view that they should have more power.  Policies should work to give more 
power to refugee-led organizations and allow these organizations to have a broader leadership 
role in the refugee system. 
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Lastly, an independent enforcement mechanism should be established to ensure that 
evaluation and monitoring are occurring, during and after UNHCR repatriation programs.  This 
would force the UNHCR to carry out evaluation of programs and make public information about 
their programs that has been historically suppressed or difficult to find.  As a result, the 
organization would become increasingly accountable to the public.  With this in place, the 
organization would be incentivized to use evaluations to inform policy, and reform if necessary, 
in order to ensure that everything is being done to maximize the safety and well-being of 
returnees. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
There is still extensive research that should be conducted in order to build the knowledge 
of why the UNHCR continues their promotion of the UNHCR, and, what, if any, alternatives 
exist to repatriation.  Particularly, potential policies must be explored that offer options outside 
of the classic durable solutions framework.  This study did not use data to analyze specific 
repatriations and therefore, there still is a gap in understanding about what occurs in the 
aftermath of return for individual returnees, their communities, and their countries of origin. 
Increased findings on this subject are important to move towards the isolation of the causal 
relationships that stem from UNHCR policy and impact refugee outcomes, particularly those 
relationships that are controllable.  This study specifically could greatly benefit from the addition 
of refugee input through interviews, surveys, or focus groups.  Along with this, expanding the 
select group of Key Informants to create an in-depth discussion amongst officials at the UNHCR, 
other UN agencies, NGOs, refugee-led organizations, and governments would allow for the 
enrichment of knowledge about the use of and focus on repatriation within the broader refugee 
system.   
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Conclusion 
It is clear that there are significant shortcomings with refugee repatriation; however, 
policies and programs promoting repatriation continue to be the primary response of the UNHCR 
to refugees.  As the predominant force in the refugee system, the UNHCR must set an example 
for other organizations and governments in their actions towards refugees.  Currently, they are 
failing to set a precedent for evidence-informed policy in regards to return.  The organization 
could transform the refugee system through a shift to policies that are guided by evidence and 
practice and are adaptable to new knowledge, creating a durable solutions framework that works 
for the millions of people living in distress and exile.  The UNHCR is currently doing a 
disservice by implementing repatriation policies without clear goals or objectives, while failing 
to recognize or address the pitfalls of their approach. 
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Appendix: Interview Guide 
Section A 
● What are the driving reasons behind why the UNHCR continues to promote repatriation 
as the preferred policy? 
● What is the goal of the UNHCR’s refugee repatriation policy? 
● Assuming refugees repatriate, what do you think is the ideal outcome after refugees 
return? Is this ideal outcome feasible?  
● If this outcome is not feasible, are there specific problems that are hindering beneficial 
long-term outcomes? 
Section B 
The UNHCR’s role is wide-reaching, and the organization’s policies affect far more than solely 
refugee populations.  Policy needs to take into consideration refugee, host country, and country 
of origin interests. 
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● Do you think these interests are properly balanced under current policy? 
● Do any of these need more attention, and what would that look like in practice? 
Section C 
● Are there any specific issues that you can speak to that have arisen upon repatriation? 
● How has the monitoring and evaluation of repatriation programs played out historically? 
● Do you think that it is the UNHCR’s role to fill in gaps in the provision of services? 
● How can the UNHCR move towards a more systematic approach to the use of evaluation 
to inform reforms so that when a repatriation occurs, lessons learned are reflected in 
policy?  
● Do you think this is necessary, or is there a better way to implement best practices 
amongst practitioners? 
 
 
